
A
DISCOURSE
OF THE
Contests and Dissentions

BETWEEN THE
NOBLES and the COMMONS in *Athens*
and *Rome*; with the Consequences they had
upon both those STATES.

————— *Si tibi vera videtur,
Dede manus; & si falsa est, accingere contra.*
LUCRET.

Written in the Year 1701.

CHAP. I.

IT is agreed, that in all Government there is an absolute unlimited Power, which naturally and originally seems to be placed in the whole Body, wherever the executive Part of it lies. This holds in the Body natural: For wherever we place the Beginning of Motion, whether from the Head, or the Heart, or the animal Spirits in general, the Body moves, and acts by a Consent of all its Parts. This unlimited Power placed fundamentally in the Body of a People, is what the best Legislators of all Ages have endeavoured, in their several Schemes, or Institutions of Government, to deposite in such Hands as would preserve the People from Rapine, and Oppression within, as well

as Violence from without. Most of them seem to agree in this; that it was a Trust too great to be committed to any one Man, or Assembly; and therefore they left the Right still in the whole Body; but the Administration, or executive Part, in the Hands of *One*, the *Few*, or the *Many*: Into which three Powers, all independent Bodies of Men seem naturally to divide. For by all I have read of those innumerable and petty Common-wealths in *Italy*, *Greece*, and *Sicily*, as well as the great ones of *Carthage* and *Rome*; it seems to me, that a free People met together, whether by *Compact* or *Family Government*, as soon as they fall into any Acts of Civil Society, do, of themselves, divide into three Powers. The first is, that of some one eminent Spirit, who having signalized his Valour, and Fortune in Defence of his Country, or by the Practice of popular Arts at home, becomes to have great Influence on the People, to grow their Leader in warlike Expeditions, and to preside, after a sort, in their Civil Assemblies: And this is grounded upon the Principles of Nature and common Reason, which in all Difficulties and Dangers, where Prudence or Courage is required, do rather incite us to fly for Counsel or Assistance to a single Person than a Multitude. The second natural Division of Power, is of such Men who have acquired large Possessions, and consequently Dependances, or descend from Ancestors, who have left them great Inheritances, together with an Hereditary Authority: These easily uniting in Thoughts and Opinions, and acting in Concert, begin to enter upon Measures for securing their Properties; which are best upheld by preparing against Invasions from Abroad, and maintaining Peace at Home. This commences a great Council, or Senate of Nobles for the weighty Affairs of the Nation. The last Division is of the Mass, or Body of the People; whose Part of Power is great, and undisputable, whenever they can unite either collectively, or by Deputation to exert it. Now the three Forms of Government, so generally known in the Schools, differ only by the Civil Administration being placed in the Hands of One, or sometimes Two, (as in *Sparta*) who were called *Kings*; or in a Senate, who were called the *Nobles*; or in the People Collective or Representative, who may be called the *Commons*: Each of these had frequently the executive Power in *Greece*, and sometimes in *Rome*: But the

Power in the last Resort, was always meant by Legislators to be held in Ballance among all Three. And it will be an eternal Rule in Politicks, among every free People, that there is a Ballance of Power to be carefully held by every State within it self, as well as among several States with each other.

THE true Meaning of a Ballance of Power, either without, or within a State, is best conceived by considering what the Nature of a Ballance is. It supposes three Things. First, the Part which is held, together with the Hand that holds it; and then the two Scales, with whatever is weighed therein. Now consider several States in a Neighbourhood: In order to preserve Peace between these States, it is necessary they should be formed into a Ballance, whereof one, or more are to be Directors, who are to divide the rest into equal Scales, and upon Occasions remove from one into the other, or else fall with their own Weight into the lightest: So in a State within it self, the Ballance must be held by a third Hand, who is to deal the remaining Power with the utmost Exactness into each Scale. Now it is not necessary, that the Power should be equally divided between these three; for the Ballance may be held by the Weakest, who by his Address and Conduct, removing from either Scale, and adding of his own, may keep the Scales duly poised. Such was that of the two Kings of *Sparta*; the Consular Power in *Rome*; that of the Kings of *Media* before the Reign of *Cyrus*, as represented by *Xenophon*; and that of the several limited States in the *Gothick* Institutions.

WHEN the Ballance is broke, whether by the Negligence, Folly, or Weakness of the Hand that held it, or by mighty Weights fallen into either Scale; the Power will never continue long in equal Division between the two remaining Parties, but (until the Ballance is fixed anew) will run entirely into one. This gives the truest Account of what is understood in the most ancient and approved *Greek* Authors, by the Word *Tyranny*; which is not meant for the seizing of the uncontrouled, or absolute Power into the Hands of a single Person; (as many superficial Men have grosly mistaken) but for the breaking of the Ballance by whatever Hand, and leaving the Power wholly in one scale. For *Tyranny* and *Usurpation* in a State, are by no Means

confined to any Number, as might easily appear from Examples enough; and, because the Point is material, I shall cite a few to prove it.

Dionys. Hal. l. 10. THE Romans having sent to *Athens*, and the *Greek Cities of Italy*, for the Copies of the best Laws, chose ten Legislators to put them into Form; and during the Exercise of their Office, suspended the Consular Power, leaving the Administration of Affairs in their Hands. These very Men, although chosen for such a Work, as the digesting a Body of Laws for the Government of a free State, did immediately usurp arbitrary Power, ran into all the Forms of it, had their Guards and Spies, after the Practice of the Tyrants of those Ages; affected kingly State, destroyed the Nobles, and oppressed the People; one of them proceeding so far as to endeavour to force a Lady of great Virtue; the very Crime which gave Occasion to the Expulsion of the Regal Power but sixty Years before, as this Attempt did to that of the *Decemviri*.

THE *Ephori* in *Sparta* were, at first, only certain Persons deputed by the Kings to judge in Civil Matters, while *They* were employed in the Wars. These Men, at several Times, usurped the absolute Authority, and were as cruel Tyrants as any in their Age.

Thucid. lib. 8. SOON after the unfortunate Expedition into *Sicily*, the *Athenians* chose four Hundred Men for Administration of Affairs, who became a Body of Tyrants, and were called in the Language of those Ages, an *Oligarchy*, or Tyranny of the *Few*; under which hateful Denomination, they were soon after deposed in great Rage by the People.

Xenoph. de Rebus Græc. l. 2. WHEN *Athens* was subdued by *Lysander*, he appointed Thirty Men for the Administration of that City, who immediately fell into the rankest Tyranny: But this was not all: For conceiving their Power, not founded on a *Basis* large enough, they admitted three Thousand into a Share of the Government; and thus fortified, became the cruelest Tyranny upon Record. They murdered, in cold Blood, great Numbers of the best Men, without any Provocation; from the meer Lust of Cruelty, like *Nero*, or *Caligula*. This was such a

Number of Tyrants together, as amounted to near a third Part of the whole City. For *Xenophon* tells us, that the City contained about ten Thousand Houses, and allowing one Man to every House, who could have any Share in the Government, (the rest consisting of Women, Children, and Servants) and making other obvious Abatements; these Tyrants, if they had been careful to adhere together, might have been a Majority even of the People collective.

Memorab.
lib. 3.

IN the Time of the second *Punick* War, the Balance of Power in *Carthage* was got on the Side of the People, and this to a Degree, that some Authors reckon the Government to have been then among them a *Domination Plebis*, or *Tyranny of the Commons*; which, it seems, they were at all Times apt to fall into, and was at last among the Causes that ruined their State: And the frequent Murders of their Generals, which *Diodorus* tells us was grown to an established Custom among them, may be another Instance, that Tyranny is not confined to Numbers.

Polyb. Frag.
lib. 6.

lib. 20.

I SHALL mention but one Example more, among a great Number that might be produced; it is related by the Author last cited. The Orators of the People at *Argos*, (whether you will stile them in modern Phrase, *Great Speakers in the House*, or only in general, Representatives of the People Collective) stirred up the COMMONS against the NOBLES; of whom 1600 were murdered at once; and, at last, the Orators themselves, because they left off their Accusations; or to speak intelligibly, because they *withdrew their Impeachments*; having, it seems, raised a Spirit they were not able to lay. And this last Circumstance, as Cases have lately stood, may perhaps be worth noting.

lib. 15.

FROM what hath been already advanced, several Conclusions may be drawn.

FIRST, That a mixt Government partaking of the known Forms received in the Schools, is, by no Means, of *Gothick* Invention, but hath Place in Nature and Reason; seems very well to agree with the Sentiments of most Legislators, and to have been followed in most States, whether they have appeared under the Name of Monarchies, Aristocracies, or Democracies. For,

not to mention the several Republicks of this Composition in *Gaul* and *Germany*, described by *Cæsar* and *Tacitus*; *Polybius* tells us, the best Government is that which consists of three Forms, *Regno, Optimatum, & Populi Imperio*: Which may be fairly translated, the *Kings, Lords, and Commons*. Such was that of *Sparta*, in its primitive Institution by *Lycurgus*; who observing the Corruptions, and Depravations to which every of these was subject, compounded his Scheme out of all; so that it was made up of *Reges, Seniores, & Populus*. Such also was the State of *Rome*, under its Consuls: And the Author tells us, that the *Romans* fell upon this Model purely by Chance, (which I take to have been Nature and common Reason) but the *Spartans* by Thought, and Design. And such at *Carthage* was the *Summa Reipublicæ*, or Power in the last Resort; for they had their Kings called *Suffetes*, and a Senate which had the Power of *Nobles*, and the *People* had a Share established too.

SECONDLY, It will follow, That those Reasoners, who employ so much of their Zeal, their Wit, and their Leisure for upholding the Ballance of Power in *Christendom*, at the same Time that by their Practices they are endeavouring to destroy it at home; are not such mighty Patriots, or so much in the true Interest of their Country, as they would affect to be thought; but seem to be employed like a Man, who pulls down with his right Hand what he has been building with his left.

THIRDLY, This makes appear the Error of those, who think it an uncontrollable Maxim, that Power is always safer lodged in many Hands than in one. For, if these many Hands be made up, only from one of the three Divisions before-mentioned; it is plain from those Examples already produced, and easy to be paralleled in other Ages and Countries, that they are as capable of enslaving the Nation, and of acting all Manner of *Tyranny* and *Oppression*, as it is possible for a single Person to be; although we should suppose their Number to be not only of four or five Hundred, but above three Thousand.

AGAIN, It is manifest from what hath been said, that in order to preserve the Ballance in a mixed State, the Limits of Power deposited with each Party ought to be ascertained, and generally

known. The Defect of this is the Cause that introduces those Strugglings in a State about *Prerogative* and *Liberty*, about Encroachments of the *Few*, upon the Rights of the *Many*, and of the *Many* upon the Privileges of the *Few*; which ever did, and ever will conclude in a Tyranny; First, either of the *Few*, or the *Many*, but at last infallibly of a single Person. For, which ever of the three Divisions in a State is upon the Scramble for more Power than its own, (as one or other of them generally is) unless due Care be taken by the other two; upon every new Question that arises, they will be sure to decide in favour of themselves, talk much of *inherent Right*; they will nourish up a dormant Power, and reserve Privileges in *petto*, to exert upon Occasions, to serve Expedients, and to urge upon Necessities. They will make large Demands, and scanty Concessions, ever coming off considerable Gainers: Thus at length the Ballance is broke, and Tyranny let in; from which Door of the three it matters not.

To pretend to a *declarative* Right upon any Occasion whatsoever, is little less than to make use of the whole Power; That is, to declare an Opinion to be Law, which hath always been contested, or perhaps never started before such an Incident brought it on the Stage. Not to consent to the enacting of such a Law, which has no View besides the general Good, unless another Law shall at the same Time pass with no other View, but that of advancing the Power of one Party alone; what is this, but to claim a positive Voice as well as a negative? To pretend that great Changes and Alienations of Property have created new and great Dependences, and consequently new Additions of Power, as some Reasoners have done, is a most dangerous Tenet: If Dominion must follow Property, let it follow in the same Pace: For Changes in Property through the Bulk of a Nation make slow Marches, and its due Power always attends it. To conclude, that whatever Attempt is begun by an Assembly, ought to be pursued to the End, without regard to the greatest Incidents that may happen to alter the Case; to count it mean, and below the *Dignity of a House*, to quit a Prosecution; to resolve upon a Conclusion, before it is possible to be apprised of the Premises: To act thus, I say, is to affect not only absolute Power, but Infallibility too. Yet such unaccountable Proceed-

ings as these have popular Assemblies engaged in, for want of fixing the due Limits of *Power* and *Privilege*.

GREAT Changes may, indeed, be made in a Government, yet the Form continue, and the Ballance be held; but large Intervals of Time must pass between every such Innovation, enough to melt down, and make it of a Piece with the Constitution. Such we are told were the Proceedings of *Solon*, when he modelled anew the *Athenian* Commonwealth. And what Convulsions in our own, as well as other States, have been bred by a Neglect of this Rule, is fresh and notorious enough: It is too soon, in all Conscience, to repeat this Error again.

HAVING shewn that there is a natural Ballance of Power in all free States, and how it hath been divided sometimes by the People themselves, as in *Rome*; at others by the Institutions of the Legislators, as in the several States of *Greece* and *Sicily*: The next thing is to examine what Methods have been taken to break or overthrow this Ballance; which every one of the three Parties hath continually endeavoured, as Opportunities have served; as might appear from the Stories of most Ages and Countries. For, absolute Power in a particular State, is of the same Nature with universal Monarchy in several States adjoining to each other. So endless and exorbitant are the Desires of Men, whether considered in their Persons or their States, that they will grasp at all, and can form no Scheme of perfect Happiness with less. Ever since Men have been united into Governments, the Hopes and Endeavours after universal Monarchy have been bandied among them, from the Reign of *Ninus*, to this of the *most Christian King*: In which Pursuits, Commonwealths have had their Share, as well as Monarchs: So the *Athenians*, the *Spartans*, the *Thebans*, and the *Achaians*, did several Times aim at the universal Monarchy of *Greece*: So the Commonwealths of *Carthage* and *Rome*, affected the universal Monarchy of the then known World. In like Manner hath absolute Power been pursued by the several Parties of each particular State; wherein single Persons have met with most Success, although the Endeavours of the *Few* and the *Many* have been frequent enough: Yet, being neither so uniform in their Designs, nor so direct in their Views, they neither could manage

nor maintain the Power they had got; but were ever deceived by the Popularity, and Ambition of some single Person. So that it will be always a wrong Step in Policy, for the *Nobles*, or *Commons* to carry their Endeavours after Power so far, as to overthrow the Ballance: And it would be enough to damp their Warmth in such Pursuits, if they could once reflect, that in such a Course they will be sure to run upon the very Rock that they meant to avoid; which I suppose they would have us think, is the Tyranny of a single Person.

MANY Examples might be produced of the Endeavours from each of these three Rivals after absolute Power: But I shall suit my Discourse to the Time I am writing it; and relate only such Dissentions in *Greece* and *Rome*, between the *Nobles* and *Commons*, with the Consequences of them, wherein the latter were the Aggressors.

I SHALL begin with *Greece*, where my Observations shall be confined to *Athens*; although several Instances might be brought from other States thereof.

CHAP. II.

Of the Dissentions in Athens, between the Few and the Many.

THESEUS is the first, who is recorded with any Appearance of Truth to have brought the *Grecians* from a barbarous Manner of Life, among scattered Villages, into Cities; and to have established the *popular State* in *Athens*, assigning to himself the Guardianship of the Laws, and chief Command in War. He was forced, after some Time, to leave the *Athenians* to their own Measures, upon Account of their seditious Temper, which ever continued with them till the final Dissolution of their Government by the *Romans*. It seems, the Country about *Attica* was the most barren of any in *Greece*; through which Means, it happened that the Natives were never expelled by the Fury of Invaders, (who thought it not worth a Conquest) but continued always *Aborigines*; and therefore retained, through all Revolutions, a Tincture of that turbulent Spirit wherewith their Government began. This Institution of *Theseus* appears to have been rather a Sort of mixed Monarchy than a popular State; and for ought we know, might continue so during the Series of Kings till the Death of *Codrus*. From this last Prince, *Solon* was said to be descended; who finding the People engaged in two violent Factions, of the P O O R and the R I C H, and in great Confusion thereupon; refusing the Monarchy which was offered him, chose rather to cast the Government after another Model, wherein he made due Provision for settling the Ballance of Power, chusing a Senate of 400, and disposing the Magistracies, and Offices according to Mens Estates; leaving to the Multitude their Votes in Electing, and the Power of judging certain Processes by Appeal. This Council of 400 was chosen, 100 out of each Tribe; and seems to have been a Body Representative of the People; although the People Collective reserved a Share of Power to themselves. It is a Point of History perplexed enough; but thus much is certain, that the Ballance of Power was pro-

vided for; else *Pysistratus*, (called by Authors the Tyrant of *Athens*) could never have governed so peaceably as he did, without changing any of *Solon's* Laws. These several Powers, together with that of the *Archon*, or chief Magistrate, made up the Form of Government in *Athens*, at what Time it began to appear upon the Scene of Action and Story.

*Herodot.
lib. i.*

The first great Man bred up under this Institution was *Miltiades*, who lived about Ninety Years after *Solon*; and is reckoned to have been the first great Captain not only of *Athens*, but of all *Greece*. From the Time of *Miltiades* to that of *Phocion*, who is looked upon as the last famous General of *Athens*, are about 130 Years: After which they were subdued and insulted by *Alexander's* Captains, and continued under several Revolutions, a small truckling State of no Name, or Reputation, untill they fell with the rest of *Greece* under the Power of the *Romans*.

DURING this Period from *Miltiades* to *Phocion*, I shall trace the Conduct of the *Athenians*, with relation to their Dissentions between the PEOPLE and some of their GENERALS; who, at that Time, by their Power and Credit in the Army, in a warlike Commonwealth, and often supported by each other, were, with the Magistrates and other Civil Officers, a Sort of Counterpoise to the Power of the People, who since the Death of *Solon*, had already made great Encroachments. What these Dissentions were, how founded, and what the Consequences of them, I shall briefly and impartially relate.

I MUST here premise, that the *Nobles* in *Athens* were not at this Time a Corporate Assembly, that I can gather; therefore the Resentments of the Commons were usually turned against particular Persons, and by way of Articles of Impeachment. Whereas the Commons in *Rome*, and some other States, (as will appear in proper Place) although they followed this Method upon Occasion, yet generally pursued the Enlargement of their Power, by more set Quarrels of one entire Assembly against another. However, the Custom of particular Impeachments being not limited to former Ages, any more than that of general Struggles, and Dissentions betwixt fixed Assemblies of Nobles and Commons; and the Ruin of *Greece* having been owing to the

former, as that of *Rome* was to the latter; I shall treat on both expresly; that those States, who are concerned in either (if at least there be any such now in the World) may, by observing the Means and Issues of former Dissentions, learn whether the Causes are alike in theirs; and if they find them to be so, may consider whether they ought not justly to apprehend the same Effects.

To speak of every particular Person, impeached by the Commons of *Athens*, within the Compass designed, would introduce the History of almost every great Man they had among them. I shall therefore take Notice only of six, who living in that Period of Time when *Athens* was at the Height of its Glory, (as indeed it could not be otherwise, while such Hands were at the Helm) although *impeached for high Crimes and Misdemeanors*, such as *Bribery, arbitrary Proceedings, misapplying, or imbezling publick Funds, ill Conduct at Sea*, and the like; were honoured and lamented by their Country, as the Preservers of it, and have had the Veneration of all Ages since justly paid to their Memories.

MILTIADES was one of the *Athenian* Generals against the *Persian* Power; and the famous Victory at *Marathon* was chiefly owing to his Valour and Conduct. Being sent some time after to reduce the Island *Paros*, he mistook a great Fire at Distance for the *Fleet*, and being no ways a Match for the Enemy, set sail to *Athens*. At his Arrival he was *impeached* by the Commons for Treachery, although not able to appear by reason of his Wounds; fined 30000 Crowns, and died in Prison. Although the Consequences of this Proceeding upon the Affairs of *Athens*, were no more than the untimely Loss of so great and good a Man, yet I could not forbear relating it.

THEIR next great Man was *Aristides*: Besides the mighty Service he had done his Country in the Wars; he was a Person of the strictest Justice, and best acquainted with the Laws, as well as Forms of their Government; so that he was in a Manner *Chancellor* of *Athens*. This Man, upon a slight and false Accusation of *favouring arbitrary Power*, was banished by *Ostracism*; which rendered into modern *English*, would signify, that they voted *he should be removed from their Presence and Councils for ever*. But, they had soon the Wit to recal him; and to that Action

owed the Preservation of their State by his future Services. For, it must be still confessed in Behalf of the *Athenian* People, that they never conceived themselves perfectly infallible, nor arrived to the Heights of *modern Assemblies*, to make *Obstinacy* confirm what *sudden Heat* and *Temerity* began. They thought it not *below the Dignity* of an Assembly to endeavour at correcting an ill Step; at least to repent, although it often fell out too late.

THEMISTOCLES was at first a *Commoner* himself. It was he who raised the *Athenians* to their *Greatness at Sea*, which he thought to be the true and constant Interest of that Commonwealth; and the famous Naval Victory over the *Persians* at *Salamis*, was owing to his Conduct. It seems, the People observed somewhat of Haughtiness in his Temper and Behaviour, and therefore banished him for five Years; but finding some slight Matter of Accusation against him, they sent to seize his Person, and he hardly escaped to the *Persian* Court; from whence, if the Love of his Country had not surmounted its base Ingratitude to him, he had many Invitations to return at the Head of the *Persian* Fleet, and take a terrible Revenge; but he rather chose a voluntary Death.

THE People of *Athens* impeached *Pericles* for *misapplying the publick Revenues to his own private Use*. He had been a Person of great Deservings from the Republick, was an *admirable Speaker*, and very popular; *his Accounts were confused; and he wanted Time to adjust them*; therefore, meerly to divert that Difficulty, and the Consequences of it, he was forced to engage his Country in the *Peloponnesian* War, the longest that ever was known in *Greece*; and which ended in the utter Ruin of *Athens*.

THE same People having resolved to subdue *Sicily*, sent a mighty Fleet under the Command of *Nicias*, *Lamachus*, and *Alcibiades*; the two former, Persons of Age and Experience; the last, a young Man of noble Birth, excellent Education, and a plentiful Fortune. A little before the Fleet set sail, it seems, one Night, the Stone Images of *Mercury*, placed in several Parts of the City, were all pored in the Face: This Action the *Athenians* interpreted for a Design of destroying the popular State; and *Alcibiades*, having been formerly noted for the like Frolicks and Excursions, was immediately accused of this. He, whether con-

scious of his Innocence, or assured of the Secrecy, offered to come to his Tryal before he went to his Command: This the *Athenians* refused: But as soon as he was got to *Sicily*, they sent for him back, designing to take the Advantage, and prosecute him in the Absence of his Friends, and of the Army, where he was very powerful. It seems, he understood the Resentments of a popular Assembly too well to trust them; and therefore, instead of returning, escaped to *Sparta*; where his Desire of Revenge prevailing over his Love to his Country, he became its greatest Enemy. Mean while, the *Athenians* before *Sicily*, by the Death of one Commander, and the Superstition, Weakness, and perfect ill Conduct of the other, were utterly destroyed; the whole Fleet taken, a miserable Slaughter made of the Army, whereof hardly one ever returned. Some Time after this, *Alcibiades* was recalled upon his own Conditions, by the Necessities of the People, and made chief Commander at Sea and Land; but his Lieutenant engaging against his positive Orders, and being beaten by *Lysander*; *Alcibiades* was again disgraced and banished. However, the *Athenians* having lost all Strength and Heart since their Misfortune at *Sicily*, and now deprived of the only Person that was able to recover their Losses, repent of their Rashness, and endeavour, in vain, for his Restoration; the *Persian* Lieutenant, to whose Protection he fled, making him a Sacrifice to the Resentments of *Lysander*, the General of the *Lacedemonians*; who now reduceth all the Dominions of the *Athenians*, takes the City, razes their Walls, ruins their Works, and changes the Form of their Government; which, although again restored for some Time by *Thrasybulus*, (as their Walls were rebuilt by *Conon*) yet here we must date the Fall of the *Athenian* Greatness; the Dominion and chief Power in *Greece*, from that Period, to the Time of *Alexander* the Great, which was about fifty Years, being divided between the *Spartans* and *Thebans*: Although *Philip*, *Alexander's* Father, (the most Christian King of that Age) had, indeed, some Time before, begun to break in upon the Republics of *Greece*, by Conquest or Bribery; particularly dealing large Money among some popular Orators; by which he brought many of them (as the Term of Art was then) to *Philippize*.

IN the Time of *Alexander* and his Captains, the *Athenians* were

offered an Opportunity of recovering their Liberty, and being restored to their former State; but the wise Turn they thought to give the Matter, was by an Impeachment and Sacrifice of the Author, to hinder the Success. For, after the Destruction of *Thebes* by *Alexander*, this Prince designing the Conquest of *Athens*, was prevented by *Phocion*, the *Athenian* General, then Ambassador from that State; who, by his great Wisdom and Skill at Negociation, diverted *Alexander* from his Design, and restored the *Athenians* to his Favour. The very same Success he had with *Antipater* after *Alexander's* Death; at which Time, the Government was new regulated by *Solon's* Laws: But *Polyperchon*, in Hatred to *Phocion*, having, by Order of the young King, (whose Governor he was) restored those whom *Phocion* had banished; the Plot succeeded, *Phocion* was accused by popular Orators, and put to Death.

THUS was the most powerful Commonwealth of all *Greece*, after great Degeneracies from the Institution of *Solon*, utterly destroyed by that rash, jealous and inconstant Humour of the People, which was never satisfied to see a General either *victorious*, or *unfortunate*: Such ill Judges, as well as Rewarders, have popular Assemblies been, of those who best deserved from them.

Now the Circumstance, which makes these Examples of more Importance, is, that this very Power of the People in *Athens*, claimed so confidently for an *inherent Right*, and insisted on as the *undoubted Privilege of an Athenian born*, was the rankest Encroachment imaginable, and the grossest Degeneracy from the Form that *Solon* left them. In short, their Government was grown into a *Dominatio Plebis*, or *Tyranny of the People*; who, by Degrees, had broke and overthrown the Ballance which that Legislator had very well fixed and provided for. This appears not only from what hath been already said of that Law-giver, but more manifestly from a Passage in *Diodorus*; who lib. 28. tells us, *That Antipater, one of Alexander's Captains, abrogated the popular Government, (in Athens) and restored the Power of Suffrages and Magistracy, to such, only, as were worth two Thousand Drachmas; by which Means, (says he) that Republick came to be again administered by the Laws of Solon.* By this Quotation, it is manifest, that

this great Author looked upon *Solon's* Institution, and a popular Government to be two different Things. And as for this Restoration by *Antipater*, it had neither Consequence nor Continuance worth observing.

I MIGHT easily produce many more Examples, but these are sufficient: And it may be worth the Reader's Time to reflect, a little, on the Merits of the Cause, as well as of the Men who had been thus dealt with by their Country. I shall direct him no further, than by repeating, that *Aristides* was the most renowned by the People themselves for his exact *Justice, and Knowledge in the Law*. That *Themistocles* was a most fortunate Admiral, and had got a mighty Victory over the great King of Persia's Fleet. That *Pericles* was an able Minister of State, an excellent Orator, and a Man of Letters: And lastly, that *Phocion*, besides the Success of his Arms, was also renowned for his Negotiations abroad; having, in an Embassy, brought the greatest Monarch of the World, at that Time, to the Terms of an honourable Peace, by which his Country was preserved.

I SHALL conclude my Remarks upon *Athens*, with the Character given us of that People by *Polybius*. About this Time, (says he) the Athenians were governed by two Men, quite sunk in their Affairs; had little or no Commerce with the rest of Greece; and were become great Reverencers of crowned Heads.

FOR, from the Time of *Alexander's* Captains, till Greece was subdued by the Romans, (to the latter Part of which, this Description of *Polybius* falls in) *Athens* never produced one famous Man, either for Councils or Arms, or hardly for Learning. And, indeed, it was a dark insipid Period through all Greece: For, except the Achaian League under *Aratus* and *Philopæmen*; and the Endeavours of *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, to restore the State of *Sparta*, so frequently harassed with Tyrannies, occasioned by the popular Practices of the *Ephori*; there was very little worth recording. All which Consequences may, perhaps, be justly imputed to this Degeneracy of *Athens*.

Polyb.

CHAP. III.

*Of the Dissentions between the Patricians and Plebeians in Rome;
with the Consequences they had upon that State.*

HAVING, in the foregoing Chapter, confined my self to the Proceedings of the COMMONS, only by the Method of *Impeachments* against particular Persons, with the fatal Effects they had upon the State of *Athens*; I shall now treat of the *Dissentions* at *Rome*, between the People and the Collective Body of the *Patricians* or *Nobles*. It is a large Subject; but I shall draw it into as narrow a Compass as I can.

As *Greece*, from the most antient Accounts we have of it, was divided into several Kingdoms, so was most Part of *Italy* into several petty Commonwealths. And, as those Kings in *Greece* are said to have been deposed by their people, upon the Score of their arbitrary Proceedings; so, on the contrary, the Commonwealths of *Italy* were all swallowed up, and concluded in the Tyranny of the *Roman* Emperors. However, the Differences between those *Grecian* Monarchies, and *Italian* Republicks, were not very great: For, by the Accounts *Homer* gives us of those *Grecian* Princes, who came to the Siege of *Troy*, as well as by several Passages in the *Odyssees*; it is manifest, that the Power of these Princes, in their several States, was much of a Size with that of the Kings in *Sparta*, the Archon at *Athens*, the Suffetes at *Carthage*, and the Consuls in *Rome*: So that a limited and divided Power, seems to have been the most antient and inherent Principle of both those People, in Matters of Government. And such did that of *Rome* continue from the Time of *Romulus*, although with some Interruptions, to *Julius Cæsar*; when it ended in the Tyranny of a single Person. During which Period, (not many Years longer than from the *Norman* Conquest to our Age) the Commons were growing, by Degrees, into Power and Property, gaining Ground upon the *Patricians*, as it were Inch by Inch, till at last they quite

*Dionys.
Halica.*

overturned the Ballance; leaving all Doors open to the Practices of popular and ambitious Men, who destroyed the wisest Republick, and enslaved the noblest People that ever entered upon the Stage of the World. By what Steps and Degrees this was brought to pass, shall be the Subject of my present Enquiry.

WHILE *Rome* was governed by Kings, the Monarchy was altogether elective. *Romulus* himself, when he had built the City, was declared King by the universal Consent of the People, and by Augury, which was then understood for *Divine Appointment*. Among other Divisions he made of the People, one was into *Patricians* and *Plebeians*: The former were like the Barons of *England*, some time after the Conquest; and the latter are also described to be almost exactly what our Commons were then: For, they were Dependants upon the *Patricians*, whom they chose for their Patrons and Protectors, to answer for their Appearance, and defend them in any Process: They also supplied their Patrons with Money, in Exchange for their Protection. This Custom of *Patronage*, it seems, was very ancient, and long practised among the *Greeks*.

OUT of these *Patricians*, *Romulus* chose an Hundred to be a *Senate*, or *Grand Council*, for Advice and Assistance to him in the Administration. The Senate, therefore, originally consisted all of Nobles, and were, of themselves, a *standing Council*; the *People* being only convoked upon such Occasions, as by this Institution of *Romulus*, fell into their Cognizance: These were to constitute Magistrates, to give their Votes for making Laws, and to advise upon entering on a War. But, the two former of these popular Privileges, were to be confirmed by Authority of the Senate; and the last was only permitted at the King's Pleasure. This was the utmost Extent of Power pretended by the *Commons* in the Time of *Romulus*; all the rest being divided between the King and the Senate; the whole agreeing very nearly with the Constitution of *England*, for some Centuries after the Conquest.

AFTER a Year's *Interregnum* from the Death of *Romulus*, the Senate, of their own Authority, chose a Successor, and a Stranger, meerly upon the Fame of his Virtue, without asking the Consent of the Commons; which Custom they likewise observed in the two following Kings. But, in the Election of

Tarquinius Priscus, the fifth King, we first hear mentioned, that it was done, *Populi impetratâ veniâ*; which, indeed, was but very reasonable for a free People to expect; although I cannot remember, in my little Reading, by what Incidents they were brought to advance so great a Step. However it were, this Prince, in Gratitude to the People, by whose Consent he was chosen, elected a Hundred Senators out of the Commons; whose Number, with former Additions, was now amounted to three Hundred.

THE People, having once discovered their own Strength, did soon take Occasion to exert it, and that by very great Degrees. For, at this King's Death, (who was murdered by the Sons of a former) being at a Loss for a Successor, *Servius Tullius*, a Stranger, and of mean Extraction, was chosen Protector of the Kingdom, by the *People*, without the Consent of the Senate; at which the Nobles being displeased, he wholly applied himself to gratify the Commons; and was by them declared and confirmed no longer Protector, but King.

THIS Prince first introduced the Custom of giving Freedom to Servants, so as to become Citizens of equal Privileges with the rest; which very much contributed to encrease the Power of the *People*.

THUS, in a very few Years, the Commons proceeded so far as to wrest even the Power of chusing a King, entirely out of the Hands of the Nobles: Which was so great a Leap, and caused such a Convulsion and Struggle in the State, that the Constitution could not bear it; but Civil Dissentions arose, which immediately were followed by the Tyranny of a single Person, as this was by the utter Subversion of the Regal Government, and by a Settlement upon a new Foundation. For, the Nobles, spighted at this Indignity done them by the Commons, firmly united in a Body, deposed this Prince by plain Force, and chose *Tarquin the Proud*; who, running into all the Forms and Methods of Tyranny; after a cruel Reign, was expelled by an universal Concurrence of Nobles and People, whom the Miseries of his Reign had reconciled.

WHEN the Consular Government began, the Ballance of Power between the Nobles and Plebeians was fixed a-new. The

two first Consuls were nominated by the Nobles, and confirmed by the Commons; and a Law was enacted, That no Person should bear any Magistracy in Rome, *injussu Populi*; that is, without *Consent of the Commons*.

IN such turbulent Times as these, many of the poorer Citizens had contracted numerous Debts, either to the richer Sort among themselves, or to Senators and other Nobles: And the Case of

* *Ab Urbe condita.* Debtors in Rome, for the first four * Centuries, was, after the set Time for Payment, no Choice, but either

to pay, or be the Creditor's Slave. In this Juncture, the Commons leave the City in Mutiny and Discontent; and will not return, but upon Condition to be acquitted of all their Debts; and moreover, that certain Magistrates be chosen yearly, whose Business it shall be to defend the Commons from Injuries. These are called, *Tribunes of the People*; their Persons are held sacred and inviolable, and the People bind themselves, by Oath, never to abrogate the Office. By these Tribunes, in Process of Time, the People were grosly imposed on, to serve the Turns and Occasions of revengeful or ambitious Men; and to commit such Exorbitances, as could not end, but in the Dissolution of the Government.

THESE Tribunes, a Year or two after their Institution, kindled great Dissentions between the Nobles and the Commons; on the Account of *Coriolanus*, a Nobleman, whom the latter had *impeached*; and the Consequences of whose Impeachment (if I had not confined my self to *Grecian* Examples for that Part of my Subject) had like to have been so fatal to their State. And, from this Time, the Tribunes begun a Custom of accusing, to the People, whatever Noble they pleased; several of whom were banished, or put to Death, in every Age.

AT this Time, the Romans were very much engaged in Wars with their neighbouring States; but upon the least Intervals of Peace, the Quarrels between the Nobles and the Plebeians would revive; and one of the most frequent Subjects of their Differences, was the *conquered Lands*, which the Commons would fain have divided among the Publick; but the Senate could not be brought to give their Consent. For several of the wisest among the Nobles, began to apprehend the growing Power of the

People; and therefore, knowing what an Accession thereof would accrue to them, by such an Addition of Property, used all Means to prevent it: For this, the *Appian* Family was most noted; and, thereupon most hated by the Commons. One of them, having made a Speech against this Division of Lands, was impeached by the People of high Treason, and a Day appointed for his Tryal; but, he disdaining to make his Defence, chose rather the usual *Roman* Remedy of killing himself: After whose Death, the Commons prevailed, and the Lands were divided among them.

THIS Point was no sooner gained, but new Dissentions began: For the Plebeians would fain have a Law enacted, to lay all Mens Rights and Privileges upon the same Level; and to enlarge the Power of every Magistrate, within his own Jurisdiction, as much as that of the Consuls. The Tribunes also obtained to have their Number doubled, which before was five; and the Author tells us, that their Insolence and Power encreased with their Number; and the Seditions were also doubled with it.

*Dionys.
Halica.*

By the Beginning of the fourth Century, from the Building of *Rome*, the Tribunes proceeded so far, in the Name of the Commons, as to accuse and fine the Consuls themselves, who represented the kingly Power. And the Senate observing, how, in all Contentions, they were forced to yield to the Tribunes and People, thought it their wisest Course to give way also to Time: Therefore a Decree was made to send Ambassadors to *Athens*, and the other *Grecian* Commonwealths, planted in that Part of *Italy* called *Græcia Major*, to make a Collection of the best Laws; out of which, and some of their own, a new complete Body of Law was formed, afterwards known by the Name of the *Laws of the Twelve Tables*.

To digest these Laws into Order, ten Men were chosen, and the Administration of all Affairs left in their Hands: What Use they made of it, hath been already shewn. It was certainly a great Revolution, produced entirely by the many unjust Encroachments of the People; and might have wholly changed the Fate of *Rome*, if the Folly and Vice of those who were chiefly concerned, could have suffered it to take Root.

A FEW Years after, the Commons made farther Advances on the Power of the Nobles; demanding, among the rest, that the Consulship, which hitherto had only been disposed to the former, should now lie in common to the Pretensions of any *Roman* whatsoever. This, although it failed at present, yet afterwards obtained, and was a mighty Step to the Ruin of the Commonwealth.

WHAT I have hitherto said of *Rome*, hath been chiefly collected out of that exact and diligent Writer *Dionysius Halicarnassens*; whose History (through the Injury of Time) reacheth no farther than to the Beginning of the fourth Century, after the Building of *Rome*. The rest I shall supply from other Authors; although I do not think it necessary to deduce this Matter any further, so very particularly as I have hitherto done.

To point at what Time the Ballance of Power was most equally held between the *Lords* and *Commons* in *Rome*, would,

*Fragm.
lib. 6.*

perhaps, admit a Controversy. *Polybius* tells us, that in the second *Punick* War, the *Carthaginians* were declining, because the Ballance was got too much on

the Side of the People; whereas the *Romans* were in their greatest Vigour, by the Power remaining in the Senate; yet this was between two and three Hundred Years after the Period *Dionysius* ends with; in which Time, the Commons had made several further Acquisitions. This, however, must be granted, that (untill about the Middle of the fourth Century) when the Senate appeared resolute at any Time upon exerting their Authority, and adhered closely together, they did often carry their Point. Besides, it is observed by the best Authors, that in all the

*Dionysius
Hal. Plu-
tarch, &c.*

Quarrels and Tumults at *Rome*; from the Expulsion of the Kings; although the People frequently proceeded to rude contumelious Language, and sometimes so far as to pull and hale one another about the

Forum; yet no Blood was ever drawn in any popular Commotions, until the Time of the *Gracchi*: However, I am of Opinion, that the Ballance had begun many Years before to lean to the popular Side. But this Default was corrected, partly by the Principle just mentioned, of never drawing Blood in a Tumult; partly by the warlike Genius of the People, which, in those Ages,

was almost perpetually employed; and partly by their great Commanders, who, by the Credit they had in their Armies, fell into the Scales as a farther Counterpoise to the growing Power of the People. Besides, *Polybius*, who lived in the Time of *Scipio Africanus* the Younger, had the same Apprehensions of the continual Encroachments made by the Commons; and being a Person of as great Abilities, and as much Sagacity as any of his Age; from observing the Corruptions which, he saith, had already entered into the *Roman* Constitution, did very nearly foretel what would be the Issue of them. His Words are very remarkable, and with little Addition may be rendered to this Purpose. *That those Abuses and Corruptions, which in Time destroy a Government, are sown along with the very Seeds of it, and both grow up together: And that, as Rust eats away Iron, and Worms devour Wood; and both are a Sort of Plagues, born and bred along with the Substance they destroy; so with every Form and Scheme of Government that Man can invent, some Vice, or Corruption creeps in with the very Institution, which grows up along with, and at last destroys it.* The same Author, in another Place, ventures so far as to guess at the particular Fate which would attend the *Roman* Government. He saith, its Ruin would arise from the popular Tumults, which would introduce a *Dominatio Plebis*, or Tyranny of the People: Wherein, it is certain, he had Reason; and therefore, might have adventured to pursue his Conjectures so far, as to the Consequences of a popular Tyranny; which, as perpetual Experience teacheth, never fails to be followed by the arbitrary Government of a single Person.

lib. 5.

Fragm.
lib. 6.

ABOUT the Middle of the fourth Century, from the Building of *Rome*, it was declared lawful for *Nobles* and *Plebeians* to intermarry; which Custom, among many other States, hath proved the most effectual Means to ruin the former, and raise the latter.

AND now, the greatest Employments in the State were, one after another, by Laws forceably enacted by the *Commons*, made free to the People; the *Consulship* it self, the Office of *Censor*, that of the *Questors*, or *Commissioners of the Treasury*, the Office of *Prætor*, or *Chief Justice*, the *Priesthood*, and even that of *Dictator*: The Senate, after long Opposition, yielding, meerly for present

Quiet, to the continual urging Clamours of the *Commons*, and of the *Tribunes* their Advocates. A Law was likewise enacted, that the *Plebiscita*, or, a *Vote of the House of Commons*, should be of universal Obligation: Nay, in Time, the Method of enacting Laws was wholly inverted: For, whereas the Senate used, of old, to confirm the *Plebiscita*; the People did at last, as they pleased, confirm, or disannul the *Senatusconsulta*.

*Dionys.
lib. 2.*

APPIUS CLAUDIUS brought in a Custom of admitting to the Senate, the Sons of Freed Men, or of such who had once been Slaves; by which, and succeeding Alterations of the like Nature, that great Council degenerated into a most corrupt and factious Body of Men divided against it self; and its Authority became despised.

THE Century and half following, to the End of the third *Punick* War, by the Destruction of *Carthage*, was a very busy Period at *Rome*: The Intervals between every War being so short, that the *Tribunes* and *People* had hardly leisure, or Breath to engage in domestick Dissentions: However, the little Time they could spare, was generally employed the same way. So *Terentius Leo*, a *Tribune*, is recorded to have basely prostituted the Privileges of a *Roman* Citizen, in perfect Spight to the *Nobles*. So the great *African Scipio*, and his Brother, after all their mighty Services, were impeached by an ungrateful *Commons*.

HOWEVER, the warlike Genius of the People, and continual Employment they had for it, served to divert this Humour from running into a Head, till the Age of the *Gracchi*.

THESE Persons entering the Scene, in the Time of a full Peace, fell violently upon advancing the Power of the People, by reducing into Practice all those Encroachments, which they had been so many Years gaining. There were, at that Time, certain *Conquered Lands* to be divided; beside a great private Estate left by a King. These, the *Tribunes*, by Procurement of the elder *Gracchus*, declared by their legislative Authority, were not to be disposed of by the *Nobles*; but by the *Commons* only. The younger Brother pursued the same Design; and besides, obtained a Law, that all *Italians* should vote at Elections, as well as the Citizens of *Rome*: In short, the whole Endeavours of them both,

perpetually turned upon retrenching the *Nobles* Authority in all Things, but especially in the Matter of *Judicature*. And, although they both lost their Lives in those Pursuits, yet they traced out such Ways, as were afterwards followed by *Marius*, *Sylla*, *Pompey*, and *Cæsar*, to the Ruin of the *Roman* Freedom and Greatness.

FOR, in the Time of *Marius*; *Saturninus*, a Tribune, procured a Law, that the Senate should be bound, by Oath, to agree to whatever the People would enact: And *Marius* himself, while he was in that Office of Tribune, is recorded to have, with great Industry, used all Endeavours for depressing the *Nobles*, and raising the People; particularly, for cramping the former in their *Power of Judicature*; which was *their most antient inherent Right*.

SYLLA, by the same Measures, became absolute Tyrant of *Rome*: He added three Hundred Commons to the Senate, which perplexed the Power of the whole Order, and rendered it ineffectual; then, flinging off the Mask, he abolished the Office of Tribune, as being only a Scaffold to Tyranny: whereof he had no further Use.

As to *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; *Plutarch* tells us, that their Union for pulling down the *Nobles*, (by their Credit with the People) was the Cause of the Civil War, which ended in the Tyranny of the latter; both of them, in their Consulships, having used all Endeavours and Occasions for sinking the Authority of the *Patricians*, and giving Way to all Encroachments of the People, wherein they expected best to find their own Account.

FROM this Deduction of popular Encroachments in *Rome*, the Reader will easily judge how much the Ballance was fallen upon that Side. Indeed, by this Time the very Foundation was removed, and it was a moral Impossibility, that the Republick could subsist any longer. For, the Commons having usurped the Offices of the State, and trampled on the Senate, there was no Government left, but a *Dominatio Plebis*: Let us, therefore, examine how they proceeded in this Conjunction.

I THINK it is an universal Truth, that the People are much more dextrous at pulling down, and setting up, than at preserving what is fixed: And they are not fonder of seizing more than their own, than they are of delivering it up again to the *worst Bidder*, with their own into the Bargain. For, although in their

corrupt Notions of Divine Worship, they are apt to multiply their Gods; yet their earthly Devotion is seldom paid to above one Idol at a Time, of their own Creation; whose *Oar* they pull with less Murmuring, and much more Skill, than when they *share the Lading*, or even *hold the Helm*.

THE several Provinces of the *Roman* Empire, were now governed by the great Men of their State; those upon the Frontiers with powerful Armies, either for Conquest, or Defence. These Governors, upon any Designs of Revenge, or Ambition, were sure to meet with a divided Power at home; and therefore bent all their Thoughts, and Applications, to close in with the People; who were now, by many Degrees, the stronger Party. Two of the greatest Spirits that *Rome* ever produced, happened to live at the same Time, and to be engaged in the same Pursuit; and this at a Juncture the most dangerous for such a Contest. These were *Pompey* and *Cæsar*; two Stars of such a Magnitude, that their *Conjunction* was as likely to be fatal, as their *Opposition*.

THE *Tribunes* and People, having now subdued all Competitors, began the last Game of a prevalent Populace, which is that of chusing themselves a *Master*; while the Nobles foresaw, and used all Endeavours left them, to prevent it. The People, at first, made *Pompey* their Admiral, with full Power over all the *Mediterranean*; soon after, Captain-General of all the *Roman* Forces, and Governor of *Asia*. *Pompey*, on the other Side, restored the Office of *Tribune*, which *Sylla* had put down; and, in his Consulship, procured a Law for *examining into the Miscarriages of Men in Office, or Command, for Twenty Years past*. Many other Examples of *Pompey's* Popularity, are left us on Record; who was a perfect Favourite of the People, and designed to be more; but his Pretensions grew stale, for want of a timely Opportunity to introduce them upon the Stage. For *Cæsar*, with his Legions in *Gaul*, was a perpetual Check upon his Designs; and in the Arts of pleasing the People, did soon after get many Lengths beyond him. He tells us himself, that the Senate, by a bold Effort, having made some severe Decrees against his Proceedings, and against the *Tribunes*; these all left the City, and went over to his Party, and consequently along with them the Affections and Interests of the People; which is further manifest, from the Accounts he

gives us of the Citizens, in several Towns, mutinying against their Commanders, and delivering both to his Devotion. Besides, *Cæsar's* publick and avowed Pretensions for beginning the Civil War, were to restore the Tribunes and the People, oppressed (as he pretended) by the *Nobles*.

THIS forced *Pompey*, against his Inclinations, upon the Necessity of changing Sides, for fear of being forsaken by both; and of closing in with the Senate and chief Magistrates, by whom he was chosen General against *Cæsar*.

THUS, at length, the *Senate* (at least the primitive Part of them, the *Nobles*) under *Pompey*, and the *Commons* under *Cæsar*, came to a final Decision of the long Quarrels between them. For, I think, the Ambition of private Men, did, by no Means, begin, or occasion this War; although Civil Dissentions never fail of introducing, and spiriting the Ambition of private Men; who thus become, indeed, the great Instruments for deciding of such Quarrels, and at last are sure to seize on the Prize. But no Man, who sees a Flock of Vultures hovering over two Armies ready to engage, can justly charge the Blood drawn in the Battle to them, although the Carcasses fall to their Share. For, while the Ballance of Power is equally held, the Ambition of private Men, whether Orators or great Commanders, gives neither Danger nor Fear, nor can possibly enslave their Country; but, That once broken, the divided Parties are forced to unite each to its Head; under whose Conduct, or Fortune, one Side is, at first, victorious, and, at last, both are Slaves. And, to put it past Dispute, that this entire Subversion of the *Roman* Liberty and Constitution, was altogether owing to those Measures which had broke the Ballance between the *Patricians* and *Plebeians*; whereof the Ambition of particular Men, was but an Effect and Consequence; we need only consider, that when the uncorrupted Part of the Senate, had, by the Death of *Cæsar*, made one great Effort to restore their former State and Liberty, the Success did not answer their Hopes; but that whole Assembly was so sunk in its Authority, that those Patriots were forced to fly, and give way to the Madness of the People; who, by their own Dispositions, stirred up with the Harangues of their Orators, were now wholly bent upon single and despotick Slavery. Else,

how could such a Profligate as *Antony*, or a Boy of Eighteen, like *Octavius*, ever dare to dream of giving the Law to such an Empire and People? Wherein the latter succeeded, and entailed the vilest Tyranny that Heaven, in its Anger, ever inflicted on a corrupt and poisoned People: And this, with so little Appearance, at *Cæsar's* Death, that when *Cicero* wrote to *Brutus*, how he had prevailed by his Credit with *Octavius*, to promise him (*Brutus*) Pardon and Security for his Person; that Great *Roman* received the Notice with the utmost Indignity, and returned *Cicero* an Answer (yet upon Record) full of the highest Resentment and Contempt for such an Offer, and from such a Hand.

HERE ended all Shew, or Shadow, of Liberty in *Rome*: Here was the Repository of all the wise Contentions and Struggles for Power, between the Nobles and Commons, lapped up safely in the Bosom of a *Nero* and a *Caligula*, a *Tiberius*, and a *Domitian*.

LET us now see from this Deduction of particular Impeachments, and general Dissentions in *Greece* and *Rome*, what Conclusions may naturally be formed for Instruction of any other State, that may haply, upon many Points, labour under the like Circumstances.

CHAP. IV.

UPON the Subject of *Impeachments* we may observe, that the Custom of accusing the *Nobles* to the *People*, either by themselves, or their Orators, (now stiled, *An Impeachment in the Name of the Commons*) hath been very antient, both in *Greece* and *Rome*, as well as *Carthage*; and therefore may seem to be the inherent Right of a free People; nay, perhaps it is really so: But then, it is to be considered, *First*, that this Custom was peculiar to Republicks; or such States where the Administration lay principally in the Hands of the Commons; and ever raged more, or less, according to their Encroachments upon absolute Power; having been always looked upon, by the wisest Men, and best Authors of those Times, as an Effect of Licentiousness, and not of Liberty; a Distinction which no Multitude, either *represented* or *collective*, hath been, at any Time, very nice in observing. However, perhaps this Custom, in a popular State, of impeaching particular Men, may seem to be nothing else but the People's chusing, upon Occasion, to exercise their own Jurisdiction in Person; as if a King of *England* should sit as Chief Justice in his Court of *King's-Bench*; which, they say, in former Times he sometimes did. But, in *Sparta*, which was called a kingly Government, although the People were perfectly free; yet, because the Administration was in the two Kings, and the *Ephori*, (with the Assistance of the Senate) we read of no Impeachments by the People; nor was the Process against great Men, either upon Account of Ambition, or ill Conduct, although it reached sometimes to Kings themselves, ever formed that way, as I can recollect; but only passed through those Hands where the Administration lay. So likewise, during the Regal Government in *Rome*, although it was instituted a mixt Monarchy, and the People made great Advances in Power; yet I do not remember to have read of one Impeachment from the Commons against a Patrician, until the Consular State began, and the People had made great Encroachments upon the Administration.

ANOTHER Thing to be considered is; that allowing this Right of Impeachment to be as inherent as they please; yet, if the Commons have been perpetually mistaken in the Merits of the Causes and the Persons, as well as in the Consequences of such Impeachments upon the Peace of the State; we cannot conclude less, than that the Commons in *Greece* and *Rome*, (whatever they may be in other States) were, by no Means, qualified either as Prosecutors, or Judges, in such Matters; and therefore, that it would have been prudent, to reserve these Privileges dormant, never to be produced but upon very great and urging Occasions, where the State is in apparent Danger, the universal Body of the People in Clamours against the Administration, and no other Remedy in View. But for a few popular Orators, or Tribunes, upon the Score of *personal Piques*; or *to employ the Pride they conceive in seeing themselves at the Head of a Party*; or *as a Method for Advancement*; or *moved by certain powerful Arguments, that could make Demosthenes Philippize*: For such Men, I say, when the State would, of it self, gladly be quiet, and hath besides Affairs of the last Importance, upon the Anvil; to *impeach Miltiades after a great Naval Victory, for not pursuing the Persian Fleet*: To *impeach Aristides, the Person most versed among them in the Knowledge and Practice of their Laws, for a blind Suspicion of his acting in an arbitrary Way, (that is, as they expounded it, not in Concert with the People)*: To *impeach Pericles, after all his Services, for a few inconsiderable Accounts*; or *to impeach Phocion, who had been guilty of no other Crime, but negotiating a Treaty for the Peace and Security of his Country*: What could the Continuance of such Proceedings end in, but the utter Discouragement of all virtuous Actions and Persons, and consequently in the Ruin of a State? Therefore, the Historians of those Ages, seldom fail to set this Matter in all its Lights; leaving us the highest and most honourable *Ideas* of those Persons, who suffered by the Persecution of the People, together with the fatal Consequences they had; and how the Persecutors seldom failed to repent when it was too late.

THESE Impeachments perpetually falling upon many of the best Men, both in *Greece* and *Rome*, are a Cloud of Witnesses, and Examples enough to discourage Men of Virtue and Abilities from engaging in the Service of the Publick; and help, on t'other

Side, to introduce the Ambitious, the Covetous, the Superficial, and the Ill-designing; who are as apt to be bold and forward, and meddling, as the former are to be cautious and modest, and reserved. This was so well known in *Greece*, that an Eagerness after Employments in the State, was looked upon by wise Men, as the worst Title a Man could set up; and made *Plato* say, *That if all Men were as good as they ought; the Quarrel in a Commonwealth would be, not as it is now, who should be Ministers of State, but who should not be so.* And *Socrates* is introduced by *Xenophon* severely chiding a Friend of his for not *lib. 3. Memorab.* entering into the publick Service, when he was every way qualified for it. Such a Backwardness there was at that Time among good Men to engage with an usurping People, and a Set of *pragmatical ambitious Orators.* And *Diodorus* tells us, that when the *Petalism* was erected at *Syracuse*, in *lib. 11.* Imitation of the *Ostracism* at *Athens*, it was so notoriously levelled against all who had either Birth or Merit to recommend them, that whoever possessed either, withdrew for Fear, and would have no Concern in publick Affairs. So that the People themselves were forced to abrogate it for fear of bringing all things into Confusion.

THERE is one Thing more to be observed, wherein all the Popular Impeachments in *Greece* and *Rome* seem to have agreed; and that was, a Notion they had of being concerned in *Point of Honour* to condemn whatever Person they Impeached, however frivolous the Articles were upon which they began; or however weak the Surmises, whereon they were to proceed in their Proofs. For, to conceive, that the Body of the People could be mistaken, was an Indignity not to be imagined, till the Consequences had convinced them when it was past Remedy. And I look upon this as a Fate to which all Popular Accusations are subject; although I should think that the Saying, *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*, ought to be understood of the Universal Bent and Current of a People; not the *bare Majority* of a few Representatives; which is often procured by *little Arts*, and great Industry and Application; wherein those, who engage in the Pursuits of Malice and Revenge, are much more sedulous than such as would prevent them.

FROM what hath been deduced of the *Dissentions* in Rome, between the two Bodies of Patricians and Plebeians, several Reflections may be made.

First, That when the Ballance of Power is duly fixed in a State, nothing is more dangerous and unwise than to give way to the *first Steps* of Popular Encroachments; which is usually done either in hopes of procuring Ease and Quiet from some vexatious Clamour; or else *made Merchandize, and merely bought and sold*. This is breaking into a Constitution to serve a present Expedient, or supply a present Exigency: The Remedy of an Empirick, to stifle the present Pain, but with certain Prospect of sudden and terrible Returns. When a Child grows easy and content by being humoured, and when a Lover becomes satisfied by small Compliances, without further Pursuits; then expect to find popular Assemblies content with small Concessions. If there could one single Example be brought from the whole Compass of History, of any one popular Assembly, who after beginning to contend for Power, ever sat down quietly with a certain Share: Or if one Instance could be produced of a popular Assembly, that ever knew, or proposed, or declared what Share of Power was their due; then might there be some Hopes that it were a Matter to be adjusted by Reasonings, by Conferences, or Debates: But since all that is manifestly otherwise, I see no other Course to be taken in a settled State, than a steady constant Resolution in those to whom the rest of the Ballance is entrusted, never to give Way so far to popular Clamours, as to make the least Breach in the Constitution; through which a Million of Abuses and Encroachments will certainly in Time force their Way.

A G A I N, From this Deduction, it will not be difficult to gather and assign certain Marks of popular Encroachments; by observing of which, those who hold the Ballance in a State, may judge of the Degrees, and by early Remedies and Application, put a Stop to the fatal Consequences that would otherwise ensue. What those Marks are, hath been at large deduced, and need not be here repeated.

A N O T H E R Consequence is this, That (with all Respect for popular Assemblies be it spoke) it is hard to recollect one Folly,

Infirmity or Vice, to which a single Man is subjected, and from which a Body of Commons either collective or represented can be wholly exempt. For, besides that they are composed of Men with all their Infirmities about them; they have also the ill Fortune to be generally led and influenced by the very worst among themselves; I mean, *Popular Orators, Tribunes*, or, as they are now stiled, *Great Speakers, Leading Men*, and the like. From whence it comes to pass, that in their Results we have sometimes found the same Spirit of Cruelty and Revenge, of Malice and Pride; the same Blindness and Obstinacy, and Unsteadiness; the same ungovernable Rage and Anger; the same Injustice, Sophistry and Fraud, that ever lodged in the Breast of any Individual.

AGAIN, In all Free States the Evil to be avoided is *Tyranny*, that is to say, the *Summa Imperii*, or unlimited Power solely in the Hands of the *One*, the *Few*, or the *Many*. Now, we have shewn, that although most Revolutions of Government in *Greece* and *Rome* began with the Tyranny of the People, yet they generally concluded in that of a single Person. So that an usurping Populace is its own *Dupe*; a meer Underworker, and a Purchaser in Trust for some single Tyrant; whose State and Power they advance to their own Ruin, with as blind an Instinct, as those Worms that die with weaving magnificent Habits for Beings of a superior Nature to their own.

CHAP. V.

SOME Reflections upon the late publick Proceedings among us, and that Variety of Factions, in which we are still so intricately engaged, gave Occasion to this Discourse. I am not conscious that I have forced one Example, or put it into any other Light than it appeared to me, long before I had Thoughts of producing it.

I CANNOT conclude without adding some particular Remarks upon the present Posture of Affairs, and Dispositions in this Kingdom.

THE Fate of Empire is grown a common Place: That all Forms of Government having been instituted by Men, must be mortal like their Authors, and have their Periods of Duration limited, as well as those of private Persons; this is a Truth of vulgar Knowledge and Observation. But there are few who turn their Thoughts to examine how these Diseases in a State are bred, that hasten its End; which would, however, be a very useful Enquiry. For, although we cannot prolong the Period of a Commonwealth beyond the Decree of Heaven, or the Date of its Nature, any more than human Life, beyond the Strength of the Seminal Virtue; yet we may manage a sickly Constitution, and preserve a strong one; we may watch and prevent Accidents; we may turn off a great Blow from without, and purge away an ill Humour that is lurking within: And by these and other such Methods, render a State long-lived, although not immortal. Yet some Physicians have thought, that if it were practicable to keep the several Humours of the Body in an exact equal Ballance of each with its Opposite, it might be immortal; and so perhaps would a political Body, if the Ballance of Power could be always held exactly even. But I doubt, this is as almost impossible in the Practice as the other.

It hath an Appearance of Fatality, and that the Period of a State approacheth, when a Concurrence of many Circumstances, both within and without, unite towards its Ruin; while the whole

Body of the People are either stupidly negligent, or else giving in with all their Might, to those very Practices that are working their Destruction. To see whole Bodies of Men breaking a Constitution by the very same Errors that so many have been broke before: To observe opposite Parties, who can agree in nothing else, yet firmly united in such Measures as must certainly ruin their Country: In short, to be encompassed with the greatest Dangers from without; to be torn by many virulent Factions within; then to be secure and senseless under all this, and to make it the very least of our Concern: These and some others that might be named, appear to me to be the most likely Symptoms in a State of a *Sickness unto Death*.

*Quod prœcul à nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans.
Et ratio potius, quam res persuadeat ipsa,* Lucr.

THERE are some Conjunctions wherein the Death or Dissolution of Government is more lamentable in its Consequences than it would be in others. And, I think, a State can never arrive to its Period in a more deplorable *Crisis*, than at a Time when some *Prince in the Neighbourhood*, of vast Power and Ambition, lies hovering like a Vulture to devour, or at least dismember its dying Carcase; by which Means, it becomes only a Province or Acquisition to some mighty Monarchy, without Hopes of a Resurrection.

IKNOW very well, there is a Set of sanguine Tempers, who deride and ridicule in the Number of Fopperies all such Apprehensions as these. They have it ready in their Mouths, that the People of *England* are of a Genius and Temper, never to admit Slavery among them; and they are furnished with a great many Common-Places upon that Subject. But it seems to me, that such Discourers do reason upon short Views, and a very moderate Compass of Thought. For, I think it a great Error to count upon the Genius of a Nation as a standing Argument in all Ages; since there is hardly a Spot of Ground in *Europe*, where the Inhabitants have not frequently and entirely changed their Temper and Genius. Neither can I see any Reason, why the Genius of a Nation should be more fixed in the Point of Government, than

in their Morals, their Learning, their Religion, their common Humour and Conversation, their Diet and their Complexion; which do all notoriously vary, almost in every Age; and may every one of them have great Effects upon Men's Notions of Government.

SINCE the *Norman* Conquest, the Ballance of Power in *England* hath often varied, and sometimes been wholly overturned: The Part which the Commons had in it, *that most disputed Point in its Original, Progress, and Extent*, was by their own Confessions, but a very inconsiderable Share. Generally speaking, they have been gaining ever since, although with frequent Interruptions, and slow Progress. The abolishing of *Villanage*, together with the Custom introduced (or permitted) among the Nobles of selling their Lands in the Reign of *Henry* the Seventh, was a mighty Addition to the Power of the Commons; yet I think a much greater happened in the Time of his Successor, at the Dissolution of the Abbeyes: For this turned the *Clergy* wholly out of the Scale, who had so long filled it; and placed the *Commons* in their Stead; who in a few Years became possessed of vast Quantities of those and other Lands, by Grant or Purchase. About the Middle of Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, I take the Power between the Nobles and the Commons, to have been in more equal Ballance than it was ever before or since. But then, or soon after, arose a Faction in *England*; which, under the Name of *Puritan*, began to grow popular, by molding up their new Schemes of Religion with *Republican* Principles in Government; who gaining upon the *Prerogative*, as well as the *Nobles*, under several Denominations, for the Space of about Sixty Years, did at last overthrow the Constitution; and, according to the usual Course of such Revolutions, did introduce a Tyranny, first of the People, and then of a single Person.

IN a short Time after, the old Government was revived. But the Progress of Affairs, for almost Thirty Years, under the Reigns of two weak Princes, is a Subject of a very different Nature; when the Ballance was in Danger to be overturned by the Hands that held it; which was, at last, very seasonably prevented by the late Revolution. However, as it is the Talent of Human Nature to run from one Extream to another; so, in a

very few Years, we have made mighty Leaps from Prerogative Heights into the Depths of Popularity; and, I doubt, to the very last Degree that our Constitution will bear. It were to be wished, that the most august Assembly of the Commons, would please to form a *Pandect* of their own Power and Privileges, to be confirmed by the entire legislative Authority; and that in as solemn a Manner (if they please) as the *Magna Charta*. But to fix one Foot of their Compass wherever they think fit, and extend the other to such terrible Lengths, without describing any Circumference at all; is to leave us, and themselves, in a very uncertain State, and in a Sort of *Rotation*, that the Author of the *Oceana* never dreamt of. I believe the most hardy Tribune will not venture to affirm, at present; that any just Fears of Encroachment are given us from the Regal Power, or the *Few*; And, is it then impossible to err on the other Side? How far must we proceed, or where shall we stop? *The Raging of the Sea*, and *the Madness of the People*, are put together in Holy Writ; and it is God, alone, who can say to either, *Hitherto shalt thou pass, and no farther*.

THE Ballance of Power, in a limited State, is of such absolute Necessity, that *Cromwell* himself, before he had perfectly confirmed his Tyranny; having some Occasions for the Appearance of a Parliament, was forced to create and erect an entire new House of Lords, (such as it was) for a Counterpoise to the Commons. And, indeed, considering the Vileness of the Clay, I have sometimes wondered, that no Tribune of that Age, durst ever venture to ask the *Potter*, *What dost thou make?* But it was then about the last Act of a popular Usurpation; and *Fate*, or *Cromwell*, had already prepared them for that of a single Person.

I HAVE been often amazed at the rude, passionate, and mistaken Results, which have, at certain Times, fallen from great Assemblies, both antient and modern; and of other Countries as well as our own. This gave me the Opinion I mentioned a while ago; that publick Conventions are liable to all the Infirmities, Follies, and Vices of private Men. To which, if there be any Exception, it must be of such Assemblies, who act by *universal Concert*, upon publick Principles, and for publick Ends; such as proceed upon Debates without *unbecoming Warmths*, or *Influence from particular Leaders and Inflamers*; such whose Members, instead of

canvassing to procure Majorities for their private Opinions, are ready to comply with general sober Results, although contrary to their own Sentiments. Whatever Assemblies act by these, and other Methods of the like Nature, must be allowed to be exempt from several Imperfections, to which particular Men are subjected. But I think, the Source of most Mistakes and Miscarriages, in Matters debated by publick Assemblies, ariseth from the Influence of private Persons upon great Numbers; stiled in common Phrase, *leading Men and Parties*. And therefore, when we sometimes meet a *few Words* put together, which is called the *Vote*, or *Resolution* of an Assembly, and which we cannot possibly reconcile to *Prudence*, or *publick Good*; it is most charitable to conjecture, that such a Vote hath been conceived, and born, and bred in a private Brain; afterwards raised and supported by an obsequious Party; and then, with usual Methods confirmed by an *artificial* Majority. For, let us suppose five Hundred Men, mixed, in Point of Sense and Honesty, as usually Assemblies are; and let us suppose these Men proposing, debating, resolving, voting, according to the meer natural Motions of their own little, or much Reason and Understanding; I do allow, that Abundance of indigested and abortive, many pernicious and foolish Overtures would arise, and float a few Minutes; but then they would die, and disappear. Because, this must be said in Behalf of human Kind; that common Sense, and plain Reason, while Men are disengaged from acquired Opinions, will ever have some general Influence upon their Minds; Whereas, the Species of Folly and Vice are infinite, and so different in every Individual, that they could never procure a Majority, if other Corruptions did not enter to pervert Mens Understandings, and misguide their Wills.

To describe how Parties are bred in an Assembly, would be a Work too difficult at present, and perhaps not altogether safe. *Periculosæ plenum opus aleæ*. Whether those who are Leaders, usually arrive at that Station, more by a Sort of Instinct, or secret Composition of their Nature, or Influence of the Stars, than by the Possession of any great Abilities; may be a Point of much Dispute: But when the Leader is once fixed, there will never fail to be Followers. And Man is so apt to *imitate*, so much of the Nature of *Sheep*, (*Imitatores, servum Pecus*) that whoever is

so bold to give the first *great Leap over the Heads of those about him*, (although he be the worst of the Flock) shall be quickly followed by the rest. Besides; when Parties are once formed, the Stragglers look so ridiculous, and become so insignificant, that they have no other way, but to run into the Herd, which, at least, will hide and protect them; and where to be much considered, requires only to be very violent.

BUT there is one Circumstance, with relation to Parties, which I take to be, of all others, most pernicious in a State; and I would be glad any Partizan would help me to a tolerable Reason, that because *Clodius* and *Curio* happen to agree with me in a few singular Notions, I must therefore blindly follow them in all: Or, to state it at best, that because *Bibulus*, the *Party-man*, is persuaded that *Clodius* and *Curio*, do really propose the Good of their Country, as their chief End; therefore *Bibulus* shall be wholly guided and governed by them, in the Means and Measures towards it. Is it enough for *Bibulus*, and the rest of the Herd to say, without further examining, *I am of the Side with Clodius, or I vote with Curio*? Are these proper Methods to form and make up what they think fit to call the *united Wisdom of the Nation*? Is it not possible, that, upon some Occasions, *Clodius* may be bold and insolent, born away by his Passion, malicious and revengeful; that *Curio* may be corrupt, and expose to Sale his Tongue, or his Pen. I conceive it far below the Dignity, both of human Nature, and human Reason, to be engaged in any Party, the most plausible soever, upon such servile Conditions.

THIS Influence of *One* upon *Many*, which seems to be as great in a People *represented*, as it was of old in the Commons *collective*, together with the Consequences it has had upon the Legislature; hath given me frequent Occasion to reflect upon what *Diodorus* tells us of one *Charondas*, a Lawgiver to the *Sybarites*, an antient People of *Italy*; who was so averse from all Innovation, especially when it was to proceed from particular Persons; and, I suppose that he might put it out of the Power of Men, fond of their own Notions, to disturb the Constitution at their Pleasures, by advancing private Schemes; as to provide a Statute, that whoever proposed any Alteration to be made, should step out, and do it with a Rope about his Neck: If the Matter proposed were

generally approved, then it should pass into a Law; if it went in the Negative, the Proposer to be immediately *hanged*. Great Ministers may talk of what Projects they please; but I am deceived, if a more effectual one could ever be found, for *taking off* (as the present Phrase is) those hot unquiet Spirits, who disturb Assemblies, and obstruct publick Affairs, by gratifying their Pride, their Malice, their Ambition, their Vanity, or their Avarice.

THOSE who, in a late Reign, began the Distinction between the *personal* and *political* Capacity, seem to have had Reason, if they judged of Princes by themselves: For, I think, there is hardly to be found, through all Nature, a greater Difference between two Things, than there is between a representing Commoner, in the Function of his publick Calling, and the same Person, when he acts in the common Offices of Life. Here, he allows himself to be upon a Level with the rest of Mortals: Here, he follows his own Reason, and his own Way; and rather affects a Singularity in his Actions and Thoughts, than servilely to copy either from the wisest of his Neighbours. In short, here his Folly, and his Wisdom, his Reason, and his Passions, are all of his own Growth; not the Eccho, or Infusion of other Men. But when he is got near the Walls of his Assembly, he assumes, and affects an entire Set of very different Airs; he conceives himself a Being of a superior Nature to those *without*, and acting in a Sphere where the vulgar Methods for the Conduct of human Life, can be of no Use. He is listed in a Party, where he neither knows the Temper, nor Designs, nor perhaps the Person of his Leader; but whose Opinions he follows and maintains, with a Zeal and Faith as violent, as a young Scholar does those of a Philosopher, whose Sect he is taught to profess. He hath neither Thoughts, nor Actions, nor Talk, that he can call his own; but all conveyed to him by his Leader, as Wind is through an Organ. The Nourishment he receives hath been not only *chewed*, but *digested*, before it comes into his Mouth. Thus instructed, he followeth his *Party*, right or wrong, through all its Sentiments; and acquires a Courage, and Stiffness of Opinion, not at all congenial with him.

THIS encourages me to hope, that during the present lucid

Interval, the Members retired to their Homes, may suspend a while their *acquired Complexions*; and, taught by the Calmness of the Scene, and the Season, re-assume the native Sedateness of their Temper. If this should be so, it would be wise in them, as individual and private Mortals, to look back a little upon the Storms they have *raised*, as well as those they have *escaped*: To reflect, that they have been Authors of a new and wonderful Thing in *England*; which is, for a House of Commons to lose the universal Favour of the Numbers they represent: To observe, how those whom they thought fit to persecute for Righteousness Sake, have been openly caressed by the People; and to remember, how themselves sat in fear of their Persons from popular Rage. Now, if they would know the Secret of all this unprecedented Proceeding in their *Masters*; they must not impute it to their Freedom in Debate, or declaring their Opinions; but to that unparliamentary Abuse of setting Individuals upon their Shoulders, who were hated by God and Man. For, it seems, the Mass of the People, in such Conjunctions as this, have opened their Eyes, and will not endure to be governed by *Clodius* and *Curio*, at the Head of their *Myrmidons*; although these be ever so numerous, and composed of their own Representatives.

THIS Aversion of the People against the late Proceedings of the Commons, is an Accident, that if it last a while, might be improved to good Uses for setting the Ballance of Power a little more upon an Equality, than their late Measures seem to promise or admit. This Accident may be imputed to two Causes. The first is, an universal Fear and Apprehension of the Greatness and Power of *France*, whereof the People, in general, seem to be very much, and justly possessed; and therefore cannot but resent to see it, in so critical a Juncture, wholly laid aside by their *Ministers*, the Commons. The other Cause is, a great Love, and Sense of Gratitude in the People, towards their present King; grounded upon a long Opinion and Experience of his Merit, as well as Concessions to all their reasonable Desires; so that it is for some Time they have begun to say, and to fetch Instances where he hath, in many Things, been hardly used. How long these Humours may last, (for Passions are momentary, and especially those of a Multitude) or what Consequences they may

produce, a little Time will discover. But, whenever it comes to pass, that a popular Assembly, free from such Obstructions, and already possessed of more Power, than an equal Ballance will allow, shall continue to think they have not enough; but by cramping the Hand that holds the Ballance, and by Impeachments, or Dissentions with the Nobles, endeavour still for more; I cannot possibly see, in the common Course of Things, how the same Causes can produce different Effects and Consequences among us, from what they did in *Greece* and *Rome*.

A DISCOURSE OF THE CONTESTS AND DISSENTIONS IN ATHENS AND ROME

First printed in 1701. For facsimile of the title page, see above, p. 193.

Miscellanies in Prose and Verse, 1711, p. 1.

Miscellanies in Prose and Verse. The First Volume, 1727, p. 1.

The Works of J.S.D.D.D.S.P.D., Dublin, 1735, Vol. I, p. 1.

The present text is taken from the *Works*, 1735; it seems to have been printed by Faulkner from a corrected copy of the 1727 *Miscellanies*. Further changes were

made by Swift, or his friends, in proof, but certain errors remained, which have been corrected here, by restoring the reading of the first edition as indicated below. Manuscript corrections in Swift's own copy of the *Miscellanies*, 1727, are indicated by S.

Page	Line	PRESENT TEXT	VARIANTS
195	20	the best Legislators	the Legislators 01, 11, 27
196	17	and common	or common 01, 11
	18	and Dangers	or Dangers 01, 11, 27
	19	is required	are required 01, 11, 27
		Counsel 01, 11	Council 27, 35
197	4	within itself	with itself 01
	17	with the utmost	with utmost 01, 11, 27
	18	each Scale	the several Scales 01, 11, 27
198	19	the Kings 01	the King 11, 27, 35
	22	Age	Ages 01, 11, 27
199	11	this	that 01, 11, 27
	26	Accusations 01, 11, 27	Accusation 35
200	19	for upholding 01, 11	for the upholding 27, 35
	23	Interest	Interests 01
	26	think it an uncontrollable	conceive, that Power is 01
		Maxim, that Power is al-	
		ways	
	27	these	those 01, 11, 27
	33	to be not only 01, 11	not only to be 27, 35
201	1	Defect 01.	Defects 11, 27, 35
	2-3	the Rights of the <i>Many</i> . . .	Privileges of the <i>Many</i> . . .
		Privileges of the <i>Few</i>	Rights of the <i>Few</i> 01
	20	started S	started at all 01, 11, 27
	22	besides	beside 01
	28	Reasoners S	Reasons 27
	30	pace S	Place 27
	31	make S	makes 27
202	15	of the Legislators	of Legislators 01, 11
	17	every one of S	every of 01, 11, 27
	18	as might	which might 01
	24	States	State 01
	32	several	at several 01, 11
	2f.b.	Yet	But 01, 11, 27
203	7	Rock that	Rock 01, 11, 27
	13	Dissentions in <i>Greece</i> and	Dissent(s) between the <i>Nobles</i>
		<i>Rome</i> , between the <i>Nobles</i>	and <i>Commons</i> , with . . ., in <i>Greece</i>
		and <i>Commons</i> , with the	and <i>Rome</i> 01, 11, 27
		Consequences of them	
204	18	the Series	that Series 01
	22	Confusion	Confusions 01, 11
205	27	were	being 01, 11, 27
	30	Articles of	Articles or 01, 11, 27
206	4	Issues	the Issues 01, 11, 27
	18	justly paid	paid justly 01, 11, 27
	23	<i>Fleet</i> , and being no ways a	(<i>Persian</i>) <i>Fleet</i> , and being no ways
		Match for the Enemy,	a Match for them, set sail for
		set sail to <i>Athens</i> ;	<i>Athens</i> ; 01, 11, 27

Page	Line	PRESENT TEXT	VARIANTS
206	28	no more than	no otherwise than by 01, 11, 27
	34	Chancellor	the Chancellor 01, 11
	<i>b</i>	But they had soon	But, however, they had, 01, 11, 27
207	9	he who	he that 01, 11, 27
	24	<i>and he wanted Time to adjust them</i>	<i>and he could not then give them up</i> 01, 11, 27
208	6	powerful	Popular 01
	8	Desire	desires 01, 11, 27
	15	his own	his 01
209	1	recovering	preserving 01, 11, 27
	21	have <i>popular Assemblies</i> been deserved	are <i>popular Assemblies</i> 01 deserve 01
	30	overthrown	overthrew 01, 11, 27
210	1	this great	great 01, 11, 27
	7	on	upon 01, 11
	<i>4f.b.</i>	harassed with S	harassed by 01, 11, 27
211	1	<i>Dissentions</i>	Dissension 01
	19	those <i>Grecian</i>	these <i>Grecian</i> 01
	25	Principle	Principles 11, 27
212	4	Stage of the World	Stage 01
	25	These	Those 01, 11, 27
214	5	poorer S	poorest 27
	11	leave S	quit 01, 11, 27
(N.B. an interesting correction of Swift's evidently to avoid the jingle with 'City' and 'acquitted.')			
214	28	began 01, 11, 27	begun 35
215	7	he disdaining	disdaining 01, 11, 27
	15	obtained	obtain 01
	27	and	and to 01, 11, 27
216	1	farther	further 01, 11, 27
	5	afterwards	afterward 01, 11, 27
217	3	farther	further 01, 11, 27
	22	the popular	popular 01, 11
	30	lawful for	lawful of, 01
218	16	Destruction	entire Destruction 01
	31	gaining	a gaining 01, 11, 27
219	12	<i>ancient inherent</i>	<i>ancient and inherent</i> 01, 11
	13	absolute	perfect 01, 11, 27
	25	Account	Accounts 01, 11
220	28	are left	were left 01
	30	to introduce	of introducing 01, 11, 27
	<i>5f.b.</i>	He	For he 01, 11, 27
221	1	mutinying	mutining 01, 11
	16	becomes 01	became 11, 27, 35
	18	Man, who S	Man, that 01, 11, 27
	19	ready	just ready 01
223	9	lay	was 01, 11, 27
224	2	Impeachment	Impeaching 01, 11, 27
	5	we	one 01, 11, 27
	9	to reserve	to have reserved 01, 11, 27
	23	expounded 01, 11	expound 27, 35

Page	Line	PRESENT TEXT	VARIANTS
224	24	inconsiderable	paultry 01, 11, 27
	5f.b.	Persecutors 01, 11, 27	Prosecutors 35
225	6	a Man	one 01, 11, 27
	18	possessed	had 01, 11, 27
	5f.b.	the	of the 01, 11, 27
226	5	and	or 01, 11, 27
	23-4	no other . . . than	no . . . but 01, 11, 27
228	2	in S	into 01, 11, 27
	15	these	those 01, 11, 27
	5f.b.	as almost	as 01, 11, 27
	b	towards	toward 01, 11, 27
230	27	who gaining	and gaining 01, 11, 27
	6f.b.	Thirty	Forty 01
231	12	dreamt of S	dreamt on 01, 11, 27, 35
232	28	Corruptions	Corruption 01
	2f.b.	so apt	apt 01
233	7f.b.	averse from S	averse to 01, 11, 27
	3f.b.	as to provide	that he provided 01, 11, 27

(N.B. Swift deleted 'that' and wrote in 'as' in his copy, the further change being made presumably in the proofs.)

234	7	Ambition, their Vanity, or	Ambition, or 01, 11, 27
	9f.b.	neither Thoughts S	neither Opinions, nor Thoughts 01, 11, 27, 35
	6f.b.	been not only 01, 11, 27	not been only 35
	4f.b.	followeth his <i>Party</i>	follows the <i>Party</i> 01, 11, 27
	b	the present	this 01, 11, 27
235	3	native Sedateness 01, 11, 27	Sedateness 35
	16	but to	but for 01
	22	against	to 01; for 11, 27
	6f.b.	Experience	Sense 01
236	9	from what	than 01

(Note. Swift had originally written and printed in 1701 the following final paragraph, which occurs also in some copies of the *Miscellanies*, 1711. But in the course of printing it was cancelled, leaving page 92 blank, and the following leaf, G7 (pp. 93-4), was cancelled. It would have been too dangerous for the *Examiner* to run the risk of being known to have such views on the advantages of bribery in elections.

The text is here taken from a copy of the first edition, 1701, pp. 60-62.

There is one thing I must needs add, tho' I reckon it will appear to many as a very unreasonable Paradox. When the Act passed some years ago against Bribing of Elections; I remember to have said upon occasion, to some Persons of both Houses, that we should be very much deceived in the Consequences of that Act: And upon some Discourse of the Conveniences of it, and the contrary (which will admit Reasoning enough) they seem'd to be of the same Opinion. It has appear'd since, that our Conjectures were right: For I think the late Parliament was the first-fruits of that Act; the Proceedings whereof, as well as of the present, have been such, as to make many Persons wish that things were upon the old Foot in that matter. Whether it be that so great a Reformation was too many Degrees beyond so corrupt an Age as this; or that according to the present turn and disposition of Men in our Nation, it were a less abuse to Bribe

Elections, than leave them to the discretion of the Chusers. This at least was *Cato's* Opinion, when things in *Rome* were at a Crisis, much resembling ours; who is recorded to have gone about with great Industry, dealing Money among the People to favour *Pompey* (as I remember) upon a certain Election in opposition to *Cæsar*; And he excused himself for it upon the necessities of the People; an Action that might well have excus'd *Cicero's* censure of him, that he reasoned and acted, *tanquam in Republica Platonis, non in fæce Romuli*. However it be, 'tis certain that the Talents which qualifie a Man for the Service of his Country in Parliament, are very different from those which give him a dexterity at making his court to the People; and do not often meet in the same subject. Then for the moral part, the difference is inconsiderable; and whoever practices upon the Weakness and Vanity of the People, is guilty of an immoral action as much as if he did it upon their Avarice. Besides, the two Trees may be judged by their Fruits. The former produces a set of popular Men, fond of their own Merits and Abilities, their Opinions, and their Eloquence; whereas the bribing of Elections* seems to be at worst, but an ill means of keeping things upon the old foot, by leaving the defence of our Properties, chiefly in the hands of those who will be the greatest sufferers, whenever they are endangered. It is easie to observe in the late and present Parliament, that several Boroughs and some Counties have been represented by Persons, who little thought to have ever had such hopes before: And how far this may proceed, when such a Way is lay'd open for the Exercise and Encouragement of popular Arts, one may best judge from the Consequences that the same Causes produced both in *Athens* and *Rome*. For, let Speculative Men Reason, or rather Refine as they please; it ever will be true among us, that as long as men engage in the Publick service upon private Ends, and whilst all Pretences to a Sincere *Roman* Love of our Country, are lookt upon as an Affectation, a Foppery, or a Disguise; (which has been a good while our Case, and is likely to continue so;) it will be safer to trust our Property and Constitution in the hands of such, who have pay'd for their Elections, than of those who have obtained them by servile Flatteries of the People.)

*seems to be at worst) though a great and shameful Evil, seems to be at present 11 (Cancelled Page 93).